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THE SECURED CREDITOR IN SOUTH CAROLINA
VERSUS THE NEW FEDERAL TAX LIEN
I. INTRODUCTION

On November 11, 1966 the Federal Tax Lien Act of 19661
became effective. This Act, the culmination of a project begun
over ten years ago, is part of an attempt to conform the lien
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to the concepts that
have been developed by the Uniform Commercial Code which
has now been passed in forty-nine of the fifty states.
This paper is not intended to cover thoroughly all aspects of
the new Tax Lien Act. The Act is only discussed as it will affect
secured lenders in South Carolina under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While passing reference is made to
various other matters, they should not be construed as having
been fully discussed insofar as they relate to the new Tax Lien
Act. An excellent and detailed discussion of the complete Act
can be found in Plumb and Wright's treatise FederaZ Tax Liens
which was published under the auspices of the Joint Committee
on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute
2
and the American Bar Association.
II. PmsoNs PROTECTED
3
The federal tax lien arises at the time the tax is assessed.
Under prior law this was a secret lien upon all property belonging to the taxpayer and all property, subsequently acquired by
him. Former section 6323 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code protected mortgagees, pledgees and purchasers against unfiled federal tax liens, but the above named parties were not defined
under this prior act.
The new Act protects purchasers, holders of a security interest,
mechanic's lienors and judgment lien creditors against the unfiled tax lien. 4 The Act gives definitions of all the above
classes. A security interest as defined in the Act conforms
6
with the definition as found in the Uniform Commercial Code.

1. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125. All statutory

references herein (unless otherwise noted) are to the Internal Revenue Code

as amended.

2. W. PLUMB & L. WPIGHT, F.DERAL TAX LiENS (2d ed. 1967).
3. INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.

4. Id. § 6323(a).
5. Id. § 6323(h).

6. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 10.1-201(37) (1966).
7 59
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As defined in the Tax Lien Act, it must meet two requirements:
(a) the property must be in existence and the interest must be
protected under local law against a subsequent lien arising out
of an unsecured obligation, and (b) the holder is only protected
to the extent that he has parted with money or money's worth.
One possible problem that might arise in this area is the
question of when property, such as crops, might be deemed to
come into existence. The mechanic's lienor is defined as anyone
who under local law7 has a lien on real property. A purchaser
is defined as one who for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth acquires an interest in property which
is valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without
actual notice. This is a change from prior law under which the
federal courts had said that the question of who are purchasers
is not to be determined by state law but should be determined by
the federal courts.8
III. SUPrEiI

oITMs

The old tax lien section gave superpriority to the purchasers
of motor vehicles and securities even though the tax lien had
already been filed before the interests arose. The Act 9 retains
these two superpriorities 0 and also adds others. The following
are most pertinent to our discussion.
A. RetaiZ Purchasers"
In order to remove the possibility that the federal government
would follow its lien on goods a taxpayer has sold in the
ordinary course of his trade or business, such as a sale out of
inventory of a retailer, the Act gives this type purchaser of
tangible personal property a superpriority. Since this section is
silent as to the outcome if the purchaser has actual notice, it
must be assumed that it would not give priority to the tax lien.
But this section does state that the purchaser will not be afforded superpriority status if he knows his purchase will hinder,
evade or defeat the collection of any tax under this title. Under
7. Id. § 10.1-201(33).
8. Enochs v. Smith, 359 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1966).

9. INT. Rsv. CoDE OF 1954,

§ 6323(c), (d).

10. It should be noted that this section only mentions a purchaser of a motor
vehicle. For the problems as to searching the filing records when a lender
takes a security interest in a motor vehicle, see p. 713 ifra.
11. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 6323(b) (3).
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this language it would seem that the question of whether actual
notice would defeat the superpriority status would be a factual
one to be resolved in individual cases.
I2

B. CasuaZ Sales
A superpriority is afforded here to the purchaser of such items
as household goods or personal effects in an amount not exceeding $250. There are two requirements that must be met under
this section, the first being that the purchaser has no knowledge
or actual notice and the second, that the sale is not one of a
series.
0. Personal Property Subject to Possessory Lien. 3
This section gives a superpriority status to one who has repaired or improved tangible personal property if such person
is afforded a lien under local law. This section requires that the
holder of the lien must have been continuously in possession of
the property from the time such lien arose. Mention is made of
this lien securing the reasonable price of the repair of improvement. It is possible that the reasonableness of the repair may be
questioned by the Commissioner in an attempt to knock down a
superpriority under this section.
14
D. Small Repairs and Improvements on Real Property

A superpriority is given here to the repairman who has made
repairs to a personal residence containing not more than four
dwelling units, which is occupied by the owner, provided the
contract price on the contract with the owner is less than $1,000.
Under this section it is not clear whether the lien would be good
for up to a $1,000 if the contract were for an amount in excess
of this limit. Furthermore, since the Act refers to a contract with
the owner, we must assume that if the contract were with someone such as a lessee, this superpriority status would not be
afforded.
E. Insurance Contracts'5
This section gives a superpriority to life insurance companies
which make loans on life insurance contracts provided they do
12. Id. § 6323(b) (4).
13. Id.§ 6323(b) (5).

14. Id.§ 6323(b) (7).
15. Id.§ 6323(b) (9).
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not have actual notice at the time of the loan. However, if the
loan or advance is made pursuant to the contract in order to keep
it in force the fact of actual notice will not defeat the superpriority status.
F. Passbook Loans'
This section affords a superpriority status to any institution
which makes a loan secured by a savings account passbook. The
institution making such loan cannot have actual notice or knowledge at the time of the loan and furthermore it must have
been in continuous possession of the passbook from the time the
loan is made.
IV.

PRIORITY OVER THE FILED TAX

LIEN

Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the Act
is the one which gives priority for certain commercial transaction financing agreements. 7 This section gives priority to three
types of written agreements, even though notice of a federal tax
lien has already been filed.' 8 To obtain this priority, the agreement must be protected under local law against a judgment lien
arising as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured
obligation.' 9

The first agreement of this nature which is given priority
is the commercial transaction financing statement covering
accounts receivable, inventory, real estate mortgages and paper

of a kind ordinarily arising in commercial transactions.20 In

the House Committee Report, this last category is further defined as including contract rights, chattel paper, documents and

instruments.2 1
These commercial transactions financing agreements must be
entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business.
Thus, a protected lender or purchaser would include a person
in the business of financing commercial transactions such as a
bank or commercial factor. It would also include one who entered
into the agreement incident to the conduct of his trade or busi16. Id. § 6323(b) (10).
17. Id. § 6323(c).
18. Id. § 6323(c) (1) (A).
19. Id. § 6323(c) (1)(B).
20. Id. § 6323(c) (2).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966). See S.C. CoDE ANN.
§§ 10.9-105, 106 (1966).
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ness.2 2 Agreements of the above nature will come within the
term "commercial transaction financing agreements" only if they
are made before the forty-sixth day after the date of tax lien
filing or before the lender or purchaser had actual knowledge
of such tax lien filing.23 This is a departure from the prior law
which would have required the lender or purchaser of the security interest to check the filing records each time before he
made a loan. Under the new provision, the lender or purchaser
will only be required to check for tax liens every forty-five days,
and all loans or purchases made during this intervening time
period will have priority over the federal tax lien. Before relying
on the forty-five day grace period and refraining from searches
in the intervening period, the lender or factor should consider
whether his future advances under a filed financing statement
are protected against intervening judgment liens. The text writers are in controversy on this matter, and if the intervening
judgment lien is given priority, the condition precedent against
24
intervening federal tax liens may not be satisfied.
The term "qualified property," when used with respect to a
commercial transactions financing agreement, includes only commercial financing security acquired by the taxpayer before the
forty-sixth day after the date of filing. 25 The House Committee
Report defining qualified property under the new act states:
Under this subparagraph (B), property subject to a protected security interest is limited to commercial financing
security in existence at the time of the tax lien filing or
acquired within 45 days thereafter. Thus, a lender or purchaser has priority with respect to any commercial financing
security acquired by the taxpayer during the 45 day period
even though he earlier had actual notice or knowledge of
the filing of the notice of the tax lien which precluded him
from increasing the amount of his priority by reason of
26
further disbursements.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966).
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(c) (2) (A) (ii).

24. Compare 2 G.

GnmoER,

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL

PROPERTY

§ 35.6 (1965) with Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Pri-

orities Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating" Lien, 72 HARV. L. REv.
838, 872 (1959); Coogan and Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial

Code Upon, Receivables Financing-Some Answers and Some Unsolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1529, 1549 (1963); Coogan, Intangibles as Collateral
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1019 (1964).
25. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6323(c) (2) (B).
26. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966).
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This cures one of the most serious deficiencies of the former
law, that being that a lender could not safely make future advances under an existing financing agreement without once
again searching for a federal tax lien. On the basis of the above,
when "commercial financing security" is used the protection is
not confined to property owned by the borrower when the tax
lien was filed, but may also cover property acquired by him
forty-five days after the lien is filed. This latter forty-five day
period is not cut short by earlier knowledge of the lien.2
Some interesting questions may possibly arise concerning the
problem of exactly when property is acquired. Suppose the borrower assigns to the lender expected proceeds of an executory
contract which is still not performed after the forty-five day
period has expired. Under earlier decisions such expected proceeds were regarded as after acquired property, and a security
interest in them was regarded as inchoate as against the intervening federal tax lien.28 The House Committee Report2 9 refers

to contract rights as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code
in giving further explanation to the definition of a commercial
financing security. This would seem to suggest that the expected
proceeds of an existing executory contract will now be considered as property already acquired, since contract rights by definition are rights not yet earned by performance.8 0
The second type of agreement which is given priority over
earlier filed tax liens is the real property construction or improvement financing agreement. 31 This article will only deal
with the part of that section which gives priority to an agreement to make cash disbursements to finance the raising or harvesting of a farm crop or the raising of livestock or other animals.3 2 When dealing with farm crops, the Act makes provisions
for the furnishing of goods and services to be treated as the
disbursement of cash.13 It should be noted that under this section
the lender does not have the forty-five day limitation imposed
on him.
The third type agreement given priority against earlier filed
tax liens is the obligatory disbursement agreement. 34 This is an
27. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 271, 277 (1967).
28. Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319, 341 (N.D. Iowa 1961).

29. H.R. RaP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-106 (1966).
31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(c) (3).

32. Id. § 6323(c) (3) (a) (iii).
33. Id. § 6323(c) (3) (a) (ii).

34. Id. § 6323(c) (4).
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agreement under which a person is obliged to make disbursements because of reliance by a party other than the taxpayer.
An example of this would be an irrevocable letter of credit under
which the bank or issuing party must honor a demand for payment by a third party who has sold to the taxpayer in reliance
on the letter of credit. It should be noted that here again there
is no time limit in which to make the disbursements after the
filing of the tax lien. The priority also extends, if the agreement
so provides, to any other property obtained by the taxpayer if
it can be directly traced back to the disbursements made to the
taxpayer.3 5 One further requirement in reference to this priority
is that the agreement must be entered into by a person in the
ordinary course of his trade or business. 6 As to sureties who
must make loans to finance the completion of contracts, their
priority is extended not only to the proceeds of the contract
entered into with the delinquent taxpayer, but also to any tangible personal property used by the tax-payer to perform the
contract. This priority, with respect to the tangible personal
property used in the performance of the contract, is only available to the surety if such interest is protected under local law
against a judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation
37
at the same time the tax lien was filed.

The Tax Lien Act's forty-five day leeway provision, 8 which
somewhat overlaps the previous section, appears to be of broader
applicability. Under this section, protection is given to the
holder of a security interest for any disbursement made within
forty-five days after the federal tax lien has been filed.
V. THE NEW SuBoRDiu

AmoN PROmION

At this point it is appropriate to make brief mention of the
possibility of subordination of the tax lien by consent. While it is
true that the lender may safely lend for forty-five days without
checking the records or until he receives actual notice, he may
still, at times, run into further problems. Suppose the borrower
is a farmer who has just planted crops in which the secured
party has taken a security interest with provisions for future
advances. Suppose further, that after forty-five days the lender,
prior to making an advance, discovers that a federal tax lien
35. Id. § 6323(c) (4) (B).
36. Id. § 6323(c) (4) (A).
37. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966).

38.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 6323(d).
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has been filed against all the crops of this farmer. Under a provision"s in the Act, the district director may subordinate his
lien to that of the lender if he believes the chance of ultimate
collection of the tax will be enhanced by use of the loan proceeds
for other purposes, as in our example, the harvesting of the
crops. The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate is expected
to utilize the authority granted in this new section in cases similar to those in which an ordinary prudent businessman would
subordinate his rights to secure similar benefits. 40
VI. OTHM PRIoREMs

In a further attempt to do away with the "choateness" doctrine
as developed under prior law the Act allows a priority to the
following:
1. any interest or carrying charges upon the obligation
secured,
2. the reasonable charges and expenses of an indenture
trustee or agent holding the security interest for the benefit
of the holder of the security interest,
3. the reasonable expenses, including reasonable compensation for attorneys, actually incurred in collecting or enforcing the obligation secured,
4. the reasonable costs of insuring, preserving, or repairing
the property to which the lien or security interest relates,
5. the reasonable costs of insuring payment of the obligation
secured, and
6. amounts paid to satisfy any lien on the property to which
the lien or security interest relates, but only if the lien so
satisfied is entitled to priority over the lien imposed by section 6321.

41

39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6325(d) states:
Subject to such regulations as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe,
the Secretary or his delegate may issue a certificate of subordination of
any lien imposed by this chapter upon any part of the property subject
to such lien if-() there is paid over to the Secretary or his delegate an
amount equal to the amount of the lien or interest to which the certificate
subordinates the lien of the United States, or (2) the Secretary or his
delegate believes that the amount realizable by the United States from the
property to which the certificate relates, or from any other property subject to the lien, will ultimately be increased by reason of the issuance of
such certificate and that the ultimate collection of the tax liability will be
facilitated by such subordination.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1966).
41. IN'T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(e).
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PROVISIONS

The filing provisions of the Act provide that a tax lien
on personal property (tangible or intangible) is to be filed in
one office within the state (or the county, or other governmental
subdivision) as designated by the laws of such state, in which
property subject to the lien is situated. 42 If the state has not by
law designated one office for filing then the lien is to be filed
in the office of the clerk of the United States District Court for
the judicial district in which the lien is situated. For purposes
of this section, the residence of a corporation or partnership is
the place in which its executive offices are located. A taxpayer's
residence is said to be the place in which he resides at the time
43
the lien is filed.

South Carolina has enacted the Uniform Federal Tax Lien
Registration Act.44 Under this act, federal tax liens are to be
filed in the office of the register of mesne conveyances of the
county within which the property subject to such lien is situated
(or clerk of court in those counties in which the office of registration of mesne conveyances has been abolished).
In the case of a security interest in commercial equipment
which is to be filed in the Secretary of State's office,45 one
would have to search in two offices in order to be sure that there
were no liens on record. In order to cure this problem, it would
seem that the Uniform Tax Lien Registration Act should be
amended. A recent approach taken by New York would seem to
make it possible to search for the tax lien at the place the security interest is filed. The approach taken by New York,46 in an
attempt to coordinate federal tax lien filing with the filing of
security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, prvoides
that federal tax liens on personal property (all types) are to be
filed in the office of the Secretary of State if the taxpayer is a
partnership or corporation. In all other cases the filing is to be
in the office of the clerk of the county where the owner is a resident. An act of this nature will keep the search limited to one
office in most cases. However, it would still be necessary under
this statute for one to search the county records for a tax lien
in the unlikely event the borrower was an individual and the
42. Id. § 6323(f) (1) (A) (ii).
43. Id. § 6323(f) (2).
44. S.C. CODE Axn. § 65-2721 to -2727 (1962).
45. Id. § 10.9401(1) (c) (1966).
46. Law of June 14, 1966, ch. 608, § 240(2) N.Y. Laws 1363 (1966).
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interest taken was one that was required to be filed in the Secretary of State's office. Anyone taking a security interest in such
items as airplanes, railroad rolling stock, or ships should always
make a check of the files in the appropriate office provided by
federal law as a precautionary measure.
The provisions of the New York Act, previously mentioned,
are basically the same as those found in the Revised Uniform
Federal Tax Lien Registration Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The revised
act, prepared in the light of the Federal Tax Lien Act, would
solve the problems in this area insofar as they could be solved
without conflicting with federal law. It is strongly recommended that the current Tax Lien Registration Act 47 be repealed

and the revised act enacted in its place.
Another problem in this same area is that of searching for
federal tax liens on motor vehicles. The lender who takes a
security interest in a motor vehicle is not afforded the same
priority as a purchaser.48 Therefore, regardless of the fact that
his security interest is to be filed on the certificate of title under
state law, he should still search the county records where the
49
borrower resides for tax liens.

VIII. RE ILING PRovIsioNs

FoR

TAx LIEw

The basic life span of the federal tax lien is six years,50 but
this period may be extended by the consent of the taxpayer or his
absence from the country. Before the Act, a third party searching for a lien was at a loss as to how far beyond the six year
period he should search. Under the Act, unless the Internal
Revenue Service refiles the lien within the one year period ending thirty days after the expiration of the six year period which
commences with the date of assessment, the original filing and
any rights thereunder will be nullified.

IX.

T= ACTUAL NoncE ProvisIoNs

The term "actual notice" or knowledge is used throughout the
Act. The definition of this term in the Act 5 ' is the same as
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2721 to -2727 (1962).
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b)(2).
49. PLUMB & WRIGHT,supra note 2, at 71.
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6323(g) (3), 6502(a) (1).
51. Id.§ 6323(i) (1).
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that in the Uniform Commercial Code. 52 A section in the Act

which will be of particular comfort to lending institutions having a number of departments or branches, provides that an
organization is deemed to have actual notice or knowledge of
a fact only when it has been brought to the attention of the
individual conducting the particular transaction, or when it
would have been brought to his attention if the organization had
exercised due diligence. 53 Whenever actual notice or knowledge
is material in determining the priority of conflicting liens, the
Internal Revenue Service will now have the burden of proving
54
the actual knowledge or notice.
X. CIRCUTLAR PRIoRrrY AND CHoATENmss-Do THEY STtLL EXIST?

The passage of the Federal Tax Lien Act will probably make
its greatest impact in the area of circular priority problems and
the doctrine of choateness. The circular priority problem arises
when the mortgagee or, now, the holder of a security interest in
property, attempts to assert his interest against the insolvent
taxpayer who also has claims against him by the federal government and the state government which hold real property tax
liens, which under statute are usually superior to the mortgagee's
interest, whose interest is superior to the real property tax liens.
Anyone who has pondered the relative merits of Clemson (which
has beaten Duke), Duke (which has beaten South Carolina) and
South Carolina (which has beaten Clemson) can well understand
the dilemma that will result between the collision of federal and
state priorities.55

This problem has now been solved by the Act. A superpriority is now given to real property tax and special assessment
liens 56 thereby eliminating the major part of the circular priority problem. One authority in this field has the following
thoughts on this problem:
Although the major problem area has been eliminated, mortgagees can still suffer the effects of circular priority in
other circumstances. Landlord's liens, attachments and
certain state and local tax liens are still deemed subordinate
to a later federal tax lien under the "choateness" doctrine,
52. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.1-201(27)

(1966).

53. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAw. 271, 273 (1967).
54. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
55. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 13 PRAc. LAw. 64, 75 (March
1967).
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yet they may in certain circumstances be superior to a mortgage which antedates the federal tax lien. In addition, a
mechanic's lien, although its former position is now much
improved, may still enjoy a more limited priority under
federal law than under state law, and the mortgagee may
be the man in the middle.6 7
It would seem that the holding of the Scovil 58 case would not
be changed by the Act. In this case, arising under the South
Carolina landlord's lien, the United States Supreme Court held
the landlord's lien to be inchoate and therefore afforded the
federal tax lien priority. The court said the lien was inchoate
because of a provision in the lien act which provided for the
tenant to post a bond and free the property.
The fact that the Act now gives a priority to the interest
and expenses on a lien that is superior to the tax lien would seem
to be a reversal of the Supreme Court's view that such expenses
of a mortgagee were not "choate" until they were actually incurred.50 The circular priority problem might still arise in relation to liens arising under operation of law. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, liens for the repair or improvement of goods
such as the lien of garagemen and mechanics60 are given priority over any perfected security interest. Assuming, under the
authority of Scovil, that such liens would be held inchoate, thereby giving the federal tax lien priority over them, we would again
be faced with the circular priority problem.
Under the "choateness doctrine" in the prior law, the after
acquired property provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
were sitting ducks. It is hoped that the forty-five day provisions
of the new act will eliminate this problem and holdings such as
the one in I.n Re Hudon and ,Son, Incorporated.61 In this case a
federal tax lien was filed after the filing of the Uniform Commercial Code's "floating lien" on the taxpayer's property, but
before orders to build and accounts receivable on such orders
were owned by the taxpayer. The court held that since the
orders and receivables were not in existence before the federal
tax lien was assessed and filed, the security interests therein
were inchoate and therefore were subordinate to the federal tax
56. INT. REv. CODE

OF 1954, § 6323(b) (6).
57. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 271, 281 (1967).

58. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).

59. United States v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
60. S.C.

CODE

ANn. § 45-550 (1962).

61. 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1f 9517 (D. Mass. 1964).
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liens. This problem might still exist under the Act in that it
indicates that a security interest is not in existence until the
property is in existence. 62 Since neither the security interest nor
the tax lien can attach until the property comes into existence
it would seem the security interest should be preferred since it
was first in time.
The Act does give priority to a mechanic's lienor63 but
defines such person as one who under local law has a lien on
real property (or on the proceeds of a contract relating to real
property) .64 Therefore liens given priority under the Uniform
Commercial Code would escape the circular priority problem
insofar as they related to real property. This result would only
be reached insofar as the particular mechanic's lienor began his
work or the furnishing of materials before the tax lien was filed.
Neither the prior lien section nor the revised one make any
mention of a purchase money mortgage. The House Committee
Report expressly indicates that the new bill is not intended to
affect the purchase money mortgage concept.6 5 Therefore the
South Carolina case of United States v. Anders Construction
Company6 would be unaffected. Under the authority of this
case a federal tax lien would be subordinate to the interest of the
holder of a purchase money mortgage, even though the purchase
money mortgage was filed subsequent to the filing of the federal
tax lien.
XI. THE

FEDERAL TAx LIEN VERSUS TnE TRUSTEE

iN

BAiNRUPTOY

A problem not previously discussed is the effect of the federal
tax lien against the trustee in bankruptcy. The question to be
resolved is whether the trustee, by virtue of the rights vested in
him under 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act,6 7 can be considered,

for the purpose of section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, a
judgement lien creditor as to whom unfiled federal tax liens are
invalid. A recent Supreme Court case 68 resolved this problem in

favor of the trustee. This case was decided under the prior law
which used the term "judgment creditor." The present act makes
reference to a judgment lien creditor. The holding in the Speers
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(h) (1).
63. Id. § 6 323(a).

64. Id. § 6323(h) (2).

65. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
66. 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953).

67. 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
68. United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266 (1965).
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case would seem to be further strengthened under the new act
in that the Bankruptcy Act in 70(c) gives the trustee all the
rights, remedies and powers of a creditor then holding a lien.
Therefore the current law would seem to be that if the federal
tax lien is not filed prior to the bankruptcy of the taxpayer
it would fail against the trustee in bankruptcy.
XII.

CoNCLusioN

While some have referred to the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
as the "Lenders Victory in Defeat," it is obvious that some headway in this field has been made. From a mere reading of the
new act it is obvious that it was intended to give more protection
to the secured lender in accordance with the principles followed
in the Uniform Commercial Code. It will be years before all the
sections of this new act will have been judicially construed, but
the secured lender may rest assured that in the meantime his
position has been greatly improved. The forthcoming regulations
on the new act should clear up much of the uncertainty in this
area.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss5/6
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